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Abstract: An unapologetic perspective in the study of colonialism in Africa is currently 
reasserting itself forcefully. It sees the colonial experience as a mere sporadic change initiated by 
the need to use traditional institutions in the administration of the natives. It assumes that the 
responses of the natives had imposed some restrictions on the creative disposition of the colonial 
overlords. With evidence from some Stateless societies of Nigeria this article shows that 
colonialism had been occasioned by currents that denaturalized the social order to the extent that 
traditional institutions used lost their traditionalness hence ushering changes that were decisive 
in nature and far reaching in consequence. Furthermore, colonialism altered the direction of 
history in a manner that laid the basis for the sprouting of dividing walls around different cultural 
clusters thereby calcifying flexible identities with negative consequences on contemporary 
political developments.  
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Introduction 
The literature on colonialism, the social structures it engendered and its enduring imprints in the 
wake of its encounter with the African, his institutional and cultural constructs have expanded. An 
unapologetic and Eurocentric perspective which perceives the colonial engagement as a mere 
episode in the transformation of the native, his institutions and society has been the most persistent. 
The presumption here is that the colonial experience amounted to quick ‘fixes’, simple 
‘repackaging’ and necessary ‘redrawing’ of the colonial landscape in the encounter between the 
colonialists and the native (Ekeh 1980). The revisionist version of this perspective implies that in 
the encounter the native was not just a passive receptor of colonial crafting but rather an active 
participant whose attitudes or responses had imposed a degree of restriction on the resourcefulness 
of the colonial overlords (Spear 2003; Glassman 2004; Ranger 1993). For example, Spear argues 
that “Colonialism was not simply a unilateral political phenomenon...Colonial authorities sought 
to incorporate pre-existing polities…into colonial structures.... Attempts to invent tradition were 
thus complex and dynamic processes within ever changing fields of colonial conquest, rule and 
exploitation” (Spear 2003, 4-5).  
Accordingly, while this perspective does not deny the existence of elements of social 
change in the dialectics of human development, it simply assumes that colonial experience was a 
mere episode - the impact of which does not ‘tame, discipline and order’ society in an explicit and 
predictable manner (Ekeh 1980). As such these episodic changes do not create sharp and 
perceptible demarcation between the past and the future and while it persists it may not be 
immediately felt or recognized. Since, for example, ‘colonial authorities [were believed to have 
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merely] sought to incorporate pre-existing polities…into colonial structures’, not much cataclysm 
was needed to enforce that and in the process colonialism changed very little of the institutional 
and cultural artefacts of the natives in pursuance of its objectives. This, for example, has been the 
underlying perception in the prosecution of colonial administration where the argument has been 
that the colonialists used extant pre-colonial traditional institutions to reorder the colonial 
landscape. Hence, colonialism did not craft anew the various institutions and identities that took 
center stage in the political space since it only ‘redrew’ or ‘repackaged’ extant institutions and 
identities in the light of colonial demands (Ekeh 1990, Ranger 1993).  
Here the point of departure is that if Africa and its constitutive elements were severely 
affected by European intrusion, it does not only suffice to say that the colonial situation had 
denaturalized the pre-colonial fluid and permeable African authenticity and processes (Zeleza 
2006) but it generated social structures whose survival was guaranteed only by the colonial 
situation that propped them up and serviced colonial desires in a more treacherous and 
destabilizing manner (Welsh 1996; Ekeh 1980; Robinson 1961; Robb 1997; Ekeh 1990, James 
and Laitin 2000; Willis 1992). The colonial experience occasioned unsettling currents that 
uprooted authentic social order for the African and let loose confusing conditions for the society 
and its future direction. This transformed the new social order into sharply fragmented ‘fault lines’ 
that became magnified as colonialism progressed. Viewed through this prism then colonialism was 
a process of epochal dimension that intensely shake up extant social structures through the 
introduction of more permanent social forms and process whose effect permeate the society. Here, 
epochs are thought of as events capable of shaping and molding human conduct and behavior to 
such an extent that those actions and thoughts find their full meaning only within their confines 
amid enduring consequences long afterwards (Ekeh 1980). In this sense colonialism was an 
unparalleled force of change that met the native, institutions, and socio-cultural artefacts 
defenseless from its relentless onslaught. Hence, in the process of reordering ‘whatever 
colonialism [touched] it must have distorted and debased’ (Robb 1997, 247).  
  In the specific case of the Stateless societies of Northern Nigeria, the following points 
could be made: by ‘redesigning’ pre-colonial socio-political processes and institutions colonialism 
ended up altering the direction of history, impacting the constitutive elements therein and laying 
the basis for the sprouting of rigid dividing walls around different cultural clusters thereby 
inventing highly inflexible identities for groups. However, it is here conceded that the cultural 
identities generated became potentially more extensive, expansive and inclusive fiction than the 
displaced small scale pre-colonial loyalties. But, by deliberately preventing some communities 
from intensive missionary activities and allowing others to be profoundly affected by it colonialism 
simultaneously calcified the communities’ walls of differences by neutralizing the prospect of the 
integrative effect that might have ensued. Thus, ‘transforming [pre-colonial] flexible custom into 
hard prescription’ (Ranger 1984, 212). Curiously, Europeans have largely portrayed societies like 
this as essentially the ‘locus of permanent and … irreducible tribal hatreds’ (David 2002). But 
more profound is the fact that colonialism hardly levelled down the space for the various cultural 
groups to operate as a hierarchy of some sort emerged among their competing elites (Zeleza 2006; 
Mamdani 1994). Since the colonial situation generated the emergence of relatively larger cultural 
clusters, it actually fictionalized an identity for those groups into existence (Ekeh 1975; Ranger 
1984). This is more glaring in the colonial administration of the Stateless societies of the defunct 
Zaria Province in northern Nigeria. Here British administrative policy fragmented the political 
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space along cultural enclosures that it administratively referred to as districts. As time went by this 
propped up a Southern Zaria identity around which the heterogeneous small scale groups rallied - 
including groups which, were administratively speaking, never a part of Southern Zaria. 
Understanding the principles of indirect rule as a response to the challenges that confronted the 
British is a helpful starting point.  
     
The Principle of Indirect Rule in British Colonies 
Indirect Rule as a British concept of local administration rested on the search for, 
identification of, or the fabrication of a native agency and a reliable agent that could give 
colonialism a ‘good blast’ in its attempt at establishing law and order and the collection of tax. 
Such an agent must, essentially, be willing to assume a subordinate status and demonstrates 
unquestionable loyalty to the British. Consequently, after swearing an oath of allegiance to “well 
and truly serve his Majesty and his representative the High Commissioner, to cherish no treachery 
and disloyalty …, to obey the laws of the protectorate…and the lawful commands of the High 
Commissioner and his Residents” this agent was issued a Warrant of Appointment (Sa’ad 1984, 
452). Here authority was derived not from any traditional or pre-colonial source, but purely from 
the British whose rule was based principally on conquest (Usman 2006, 49). This is inspite of the 
facade of appointing agents from a class of native aristocrats in places where such classes were 
available. Where a reliable agent could be found, administrative responsibilities, together with the 
requisite coercive instruments of state, were entrusted in it to administer, and often, adjudicate 
matters according to the dictates of local customs that were not ‘repugnant to humanity’ (Tosh 
1973, 479). Where an agent of the caliber required could not be found the tacit instruction was that 
one must be invented and vested with the needed power or such an area be brought under the 
control of a nearby ‘competent’ agent. In Stateless societies where authority structures were not 
immediately visible Lord Lugard, the principal architect of the system, instructed that ‘the first 
step is to endeavor to find a man of influence as a chief, and to group under him as many villages 
or districts as possible, to teach him to delegate powers and to take an interest in his Native 
Treasury, to support his authority and to inculcate a sense of responsibility’ (Kirk-Green 1965, 
46). In essence the Lugardian enduring dictum was to either find the chief or make the chief that is 
“capable of taking certain decisions and implementing them without reference to the central 
colonial government… and either using the same or another native agency for the purpose of 
dispensing justice…” (Ikime 1968, 434; Heussler 1968).    
 In the attempt to find, create or establish a reliable agent such an agent needed not to be 
indigenous to the area, the ethnic group or the clan over which the agent was meant to oversee 
since British obsession was with a ‘competent’ agent that could effectively operate the 
administrative structure and not necessarily a search for an indigenous or traditional character. 
This truism was widespread in other British protectorates, the Stateless societies of Northern 
Nigerian and among some ‘pagan’ groups even at the clan level (Tosh 1973; Ogot 1963; Fallers 
1965; Barua 1995, Barnes 1960; Kenyatta 1965; Odinga 1967; Magid 1968; Tete 1974; O’Kwu 
1976; Ibrahim 2007). In furtherance of colonial objectives, even the status of so-called extant 
‘traditional ruler’, where such was assumed to have been found, eventually lost its traditionalness 
in the service of colonialism as the very sacred bonds that might have existed between the Chief 
and his community were destroyed (Tibenderana 1987). In the first instance this ‘traditional ruler’ 
was freed from hitherto societal moral restraints that defined and diluted his powers, and now 
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derived authority from the British enacted Native Authority Ordinances of 1907, 1910, 1916 and 
1933 (Cameron 1937, 12-13). Thus, the ‘traditional ruler’ stopped being the “embodiment of the 
tribe, the head and center of its fabric” or its “sacred authority” as the appointment, recognition 
and deposition of a chief are largely determined by the judgment of the Supreme Authority 
(Tshekedi 1936). Indeed, it is not surprising that throughout the colonial landscape Lugard never 
referred to this agency as traditional but rather as a ‘native ruler’ (Ikime 1968). In this respect 
beyond the myth fabricated by the British indirect rule was purely a British administrative design 
that emerged during colonial conquest and replaced or smashed the pre-colonial phase that might 
have been traditional (Tibenderana 1987). Figure 1 shows the structural arrangement of the 
colonial edifice and the place of the native agents in the scheme of things: 
 
 Figure 1: Structure of British Administrative Scheme in Nigeria 
The British Crown 
(The Head of the British Empire) 
↓ 
Secretary of State for Colonies 
(Supervised activities of government and approved budget submitted from the colonies) 
↓ 
Governor-General (later strictly Governor) 
(This was the all-powerful British Officer in the Colony) 
↓ 
Lieutenant Governor 
(Colonial Officer in charge of a Protectorate made up of group of Provinces) 
↓ 
Resident 
(Colonial Officer in charge of a Province who oversees the activities of the ‘High Chief’ and 
interfaced between the Government and the Native Administration) 
↓ 
District Officer 
(Colonial Officer in charge of a District within a Division and oversees the activities of the 
District Head (Hakimi)) 
↓ 
Assistant District Officer 
(Colonial Officer in charge of Touring Areas within a district or division and oversees the 
activities of the Village/Ward Heads) 
↓ 
‘High Chief’ and head of Native Administration 
(The native employee number one in charge of the execution of colonial policies at the Native 
Administration level) 
↓ 
District Head (Hakimi) 
(The native employee in charge of the execution of colonial policies at the district level under the 
‘high Chief’) 
↓ 
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Village Head (Dagachi) 
(The native employee in charge of the execution of colonial policies at the village level under a 
District Head) 
↓ 
Ward Head (Mai anguwa) 
(The native employee in charge of the execution of colonial policies at the ward level in a 
Village) 
↓ 
The Peasant 
(This person could either be a ‘Pagan’, Christian or Muslim who carried the weight and bore the 
brunt of colonial misrule in the various forms it manifested itself) 
Source: Developed by the author from (Orr 1911; Lugard 1922; Perham 1937; Yahaya 1980; Usman 2002)  
 
Figure 1 indicates that the bureaucratic segment down to the Assistant District Officer’s 
level was racialized but religiously homogenous in the ‘white sense’, i.e., strictly composed of 
white officers who shared in common religious belief although denominations may differ. 
Similarly, the Native Administration (N.A.) that colonialism created was also racialized but 
ethnically and religiously heterogeneous in the ‘black sense’, i.e., composed of natives but the 
administrative structure became ‘tribalized’ in favor of native agents of different ethnic groups at 
various levels whose ethnic identities became linked with different religion. Thus in a context 
where a native agent is entrusted with the powers to adjudicate, prosecute, regulate and extract 
revenue from other natives, among other things, colonial administration actually ended up 
entrenching the fibers of political despotism and a condition for the nurturing of ethnic and 
religious cleavages in the native spaces. What Figure 1 further reveals is that although the ‘high 
chief’ was the head of the N.A. that did not mean that he was unsupervised. Supervision strategy 
first entailed the sub-division of the Province into a number of Districts within Divisions and 
appointing British Resident, District Officers and Assistants District Officers to oversee the 
conducts of the native employees at specific levels (Yahaya 1980). This offered them the 
possibilities of supervising, and indeed, intervening on issues, for even in the customary courts 
they sat and observed proceedings and overturned decisions where they interpreted such decisions 
to be ‘repugnant to humanity’.  
This meant that the ‘white’ racialized sector directly controlled the ‘black’ racialized sector 
to an extent that made it practically impossible to have two independent colonial administrative 
sectors standing side by side. This is so because any agent found in the native sector was a mere 
colonial employee who could have been sacked at any time regardless of his invented local 
standing. Thus, the argument of ‘internal colonialism’, ‘double colonialism’ ‘native colonialism’ 
or ‘colonialism within colonialism’, suggesting that Stateless societies simultaneously experienced 
two separate forms of colonialism, the one British and the other local non-indigenous to those 
societies (Yohanna 1993; Ochonu 2008) is unsustainable. Lugard made it clear that “the native 
Chiefs (agents) are constituted as an integral part of the machinery of the administration: [and that] 
there are no two sets of rulers - British and Natives – working either separately or in co-operation, 
but a single government in which the native Chiefs have well defined duties…” (Lugard 1922, 
198). How did this operate in the Stateless societies of Zaria Province?  And what have been the 
consequences of the colonial administrative designs on these societies? 
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British Administrative Schemes in Zaria Province 
 British occupation of northern part of the Nigeria was faced by the challenges of 
administering a vast and complex possession whose extent and extant administrative systems the 
British were yet to effectively occupy and fully comprehend respectively (Ballard 1972; Robinson 
and Gallagher 1961). This also came against the backdrop of inadequate number of British 
personnel to contemplate direct form of administration. For example, it was reported that in the 
mid-fifties, the British Administrative Service numbered only 230 men, this number itself being 
considerably below the figure during the inter-war years. This was a period when the estimated 
population of the North would have been above the 11.5 million that the Region was put at in 1931 
(Heussler 1968, 98). To ease the challenges of administering the region the British divided the area 
into large Provinces which were further sub-divided into districts. Thus, Zaria Province was 
initially sub-divided into 32 districts. However, general administrative changes and transfers 
affected this number but as at 1920, 27 administrative districts were maintained. The names of the 
districts and the titles of British native administrative agents, i.e., District Heads, are presented in 
Table 1: 
 
Table 1: The Administrative Districts in Zaria Province as at 1920 
Northern Districts District Heads Southern 
Districts 
District Heads 
Anchau Dallatu Bishini Sarkin Zana 
Auchang Magajin Gari Chawai Sarkin Chawai 
Giwa Fagachi Jere Sarkin Jere 
Igabi Turaki Babba Kachia Ma’aji 
Ikara Sarkin Yaki Kagarko Sarkin Kagarko 
Jaji Wambai Katab Katuka 
Kudan Sarkin Fada Kajuru Sarkin Kajuru 
Makarfi Galadima Kauru  Sarkin Kauru 
Makera Magaji Jisambo Kudaru Turaki Karami 
Panhauya Madauchi Kujama Woinya 
Sabon Birni Makama Babba Lere Wali 
Soba Makama Karami Bikaratu Dan Galadima 
Turunku Sarkin Ruwa   
Zangon Aya Dan Madami   
Kan Giwa Iyan Gari   
   Source: (Kirk-Green 1965, 7-8) 
   
 Table 1 indicates that there were fifteen and twelve districts created in the northern and 
southern parts of Zaria Province respectively. Ethnically speaking the northern group of districts 
was predominantly Hausa and Fulani while the southern group of districts was predominantly 
heterogeneous ethnic groups of varied sizes with similarities and regularities in cultural practices. 
However, in the southern group of districts one frequently finds settlements of Hausa and Fulani 
some of which were as old in settling as the arrival of some of the ‘indigenous’ groups into the 
area (Tete 1974; Bala 2004; Smith 1970). Zaria Province was sub-divided into administrative 
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Touring Areas under the supervision of a British District Officer and his Assistant (Yahaya 1980). 
From the Resident down to the District Officer and Assistant District Officers, theoretically, they 
were supposed to play an advisory role and using persuasion in their dealings with the native 
administrators. In practice, however, the native administrators had little or no choice but to heed 
the advice issued or faced the prospect of reprisal. Thus, the attempt at establishing ‘law and order’ 
in these districts simply reveals the standard creative administrative disposition of the British in 
its conquered territories.      
  
The First Phase of Administrative Reforms  
 In inventing administrative districts, the British were mainly preoccupied with equating 
districts with ethnic boundaries which ended up creating ethnic clusters. However, the ethnic 
clusters so created did not neatly correspond with individual ethnic groups rather it became a 
cluster of related heterogeneous groups. In sourcing for an agent to administer the districts the 
principles of established jurisdiction, administrative convenience and, most importantly, effective 
performance became the major considerations (Prescott 1961; Akinyele 1990). Given the 
inadequacy of personnel and not wanting ‘to pull down the structure about [their] ears before [they 
had] a better edifice ready to take its place’ (Ballard 1972, 3) the British sought to administer the 
area through three broad but related administrative policies of centralizing power around an 
effective native agent. Subsequently the following administrative designs emerged: 
(a)  The administration of Muslim Hausa and Fulani peasants through a Muslim Hausa and 
Fulani district head with the aid of Muslim Hausa and Fulani Village and Ward Heads as 
was the case in the northern districts of Zaria Province and some parts of its southern 
districts where Hausa ‘settler’ communities were found;  
(b)  The administration of ‘Pagan’ peasants, often through a Muslim Hausa and Fulani district 
head with the aid of ‘Pagan’ village and ward heads as was the case in those ‘Pagan’ areas 
of southern districts of Zaria and Jema’a N.A.(s); and  
(c)  The administration of ‘Pagan’ peasants infrequently through ‘Pagan’ district head with the 
aid of ‘Pagan’ village and ward heads. In the main, especially before the 1930s, this was 
more of an aberration to the standard British scheme as most of the groups found 
themselves under Muslim Hausa and Fulani district heads. However, this administration of 
‘Pagan’ peasants through ‘Pagan’ district head is sub-divided into two; 
(i) A ‘Pagan’ district head whose ‘traditional authority’ historically hardly went 
beyond his clan but whose newly acquired ‘authority’ was extended to control all 
or most of the clans that comprised his ethnic group. This was the case in Jaba 
(Kwoi) independent district where certain wards and clans of Jaba extraction were 
forcefully brought under the control of the Pop Ham (Zaria Province File-C.35 
6/7/1952).  Initially Jaba (Kwoi) was within Jema’a emirate and later within 
Jema’a division in Nassarawa/Plateau Province before its transfer back to Zaria 
Province in 1934; and  
(ii) A ‘Pagan’ district head without any traditional claim to ‘authority’ over his entire 
ethnic groups but whose power is extended to cover other different ethnic groups. 
Examples are the cases of Kagoro and Moroa (Asholio) independent districts (Tete 
1974; Bonat 1992). In Moroa district, for example, the British created ‘warrant 
chief’ had the entire Asholio, Takkad and some Atyab (Katab) groups, among 
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others, in his possession. In fact, Bonat posits that when the district was created 
“Kura Sikiyi, ‘chief’ of Kaura”, turned down an offer by the British to become the 
native agent of a combined Moroa district, stating that “his people had never ruled 
their neighbors” before the coming of the British (Bonat 1992, 11).   
 
On the whole these administrative schemes were established at a period when the British were 
preoccupied with establishing ‘law and order’ especially coming after the chaos generated by their 
carnage of conquest. To add to that was the Eurocentric perception that saw the natives as 
‘savages’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘backward’ and ‘unsettled’ who needed to be refined. Thus, discontents 
were translated to mean ‘savagery’ or ‘barbaric behavior’ and were crushed by the combined forces 
of British military fire power and expedient administrative structures (Toure 1991). But up to the 
1930s these administrative schemes persisted until some noticeable changes were introduced. 
 
The Second Phase of Administrative Reforms  
From the 1930’s colonial administrators with different conception of how administrative 
structure should be organized ethnically rather than territorially had gained solid hold of the top 
echelon of colonial administration. For example, by 1933, Browne, a Resident with substantial 
experience in ‘Pagan’ areas and long standing disagreement with placing ‘Pagans’ under Emirate 
rule, was appointed Chief Commissioner (formerly Lieutenant Governor) of Northern Provinces. 
At the same time, Clarke, who had served in the most difficult parts of the ‘Pagan’ Provinces of 
Nassarawa and Plateau was appointed Personal Assistant to the Secretary - Political (P.A.S./ 
Political) in the Nigerian Secretariat, becoming Governor Cameron’s Chief Adviser on Native 
Administration (Ballard 1972, 12). Arising from this change in British administrative echelon the 
1930s, 1940s and 1950s, for example, saw the reorganization of divisional/district administrative 
units in some parts of the Stateless societies of Northern Nigerian area (Agi 2004). But how did 
the developments affect the ‘southern districts’ of Zaria N.A. and Southern Zaria in general? 
At the district level the administrative reforms of the 1930s did not affect the ‘Southern 
Districts’ as Muslim Hausa and Fulani District Heads were maintained. However, at the clan/ward 
level there were administrative reorganizations through the creation of Village Councils 
constituted along the village units, made up of ethnically related group of clans/wards (Ibrahim 
2007, 60). For example, in Zango Katab District in September 1932, the then District Head, Katuka 
Malam Ja’afaru Dan Isiyaku, in line with the general British reforms of the 1930s, reorganized the 
Ward administrative structure into Village Councils. Prior to this reform the numerous clans/wards 
were administered separately as some self-contained units irrespective of the fact that some of 
them were actually either clans or sub-clans of the same ethnic group or closely related ethnic 
groups. This, according to Usman (2002), appeared to be time consuming and administratively 
challenging as the various clan/ward Heads had to deal directly with the District Head. Kato (1974) 
indicates that the “‘Autonomy’ of each head … [had] several disadvantages [one of which is that] 
it was difficult to have mutual cooperation… [among clan/ward heads] when they were completely 
independent of each other… [Consequently] to break these self-contained units [the various 
clans/wards had to be regrouped] to form [fewer] administrative units” (Kato 1974, 102). Table 2 
shows an example of the reorganized Village Councils in Zangon Katab District. 
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Table 2: Reorganized Village Administrative Units in Zangon Katab District As At 1933 
Village 
Councils 
Number of Villages cum Wards Ethnic Groups 
Zangon Zarkwai/Sako/Bakin Kogi I Katab 
Zaman Dabo Kurmin Masara/ Kabori/ Zaman Awon Katab 
Taligan Magamiya I/Magamiya II/Gidan Wuka Katab 
Gora Kurmin Gandu Katab 
Anguwar 
Gayya 
Mabushi I/Mabushi II/Kurmin Dawaki/Gidan 
Kare/Fada Tsohuwa 
Katab 
Jankasa Magada Kura Katab 
Gidan Zaki Bakin Kogi II/ Kwakwu/ Kigudu Katab 
Fadan Kaje Wandon/ Churyam/ Tsohon Gida/ Ramfa Kaje 
Zonkwa Kurmin Bi/ Madauchi/ Magazawa/ Abobo Kaje 
Zuturun Fada Zuturum Fama/ Zuturum Mago/ Kangurara Kaje 
Fadiyan 
Mugu 
Fadiyan Mugu/ Fadiyan Yazanu/Fadiyan Abursan/ 
Zangon Gajere 
Kaje 
Gidan Jatau Ifan/Anguwan Jatau Kaje 
Kachachare Kachachare Kachachare/ 
Hausa 
Fadan 
Kamantan 
Kangun/Kaban/Lona/Tabiriarna/Zaku/Kagal/ Yagal/ 
Balo/ Tabiri Hausawa 
Kamantan/Hausa 
Kamaru Anza/Katul/Fansil/Hausawan Fansil/Hausawan Tasha Ikulu/ Hausa 
Fadan Ikulu Bato/Lisuru Ikulu 
Auchuna Gidan Ali/Yado/Gidan Gimba/Anchar/Kwarjin Ikulu  
Zangon 
Katab 
Yalwa Hausa 
Source: (Usman 2002, 197-98) 
 
Table 2 indicates that inspite of attempt at equating districts with ethnic boundaries Zangon 
Katab District remained ethnically heterogeneous and composed of five different ‘indigenous’ 
groups and a Hausa ‘settler’ group. Administratively there were fifty eight villages cum wards in 
the District with an almost overwhelming presence of Katab (Atyab), Kaje (Bajju) and Ikulu while 
the Kamantan, Kachecere and Hausa groups almost had a village or a ward each. In actual fact 
these villages or wards were more like a lineage or a couple of related lineages of the specific 
ethnic groups. In this respect a Village or Ward Head might simply be a lineage head. 
Administratively speaking this meant that prior to the 1930s reform there were fifty eight 
‘autonomous’ Ward Heads that the District Head (Hakimi) had to deal with directly. To solve this 
quagmire the administrative wards were reconstituted into eighteen Village Councils with a Head 
(dagaci) each. For example, the Atyab (Katab) with eighteen Ward Heads now have seven Village 
Units and Heads; the Bajju (Kaje) with fifteen Ward Heads now have five Village Councils and 
Heads (dagaci); the Ikulu with twelve Wards now have three Village Councils and Heads (dagaci); 
the Kamantan with nine Wards now have one Village Council and Head (dagaci); Kacechere and 
Hausa Wards were upgraded to a Village Council each. Thus, the dagaci of each Village Council 
now interfaced between the Hakimi and Masu anguwa. Each of the dagatai was appointed by the 
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Hakimi in consultation with the village elders while the dagaci in turn appoints a Personal 
Assistant (Wakili) and a Mai anguwa who together served as his ears in their various communities 
(Kato 1974; Usman 2002). 
   This administrative reform, which would continue in the later part of colonial rule, was a 
very radical departure from the normal ways of the people – who were used to their small-scale 
egalitarian social order at the clan level. Prior to this administrative reorganization not much 
substantive political power was exercised by the Magagin dodo (Chief Priest) who was, spiritually, 
the most outstanding man of influence in the society. According to Yahaya (1980) authority was 
based on the clan above which no one exercised it. At most the Magagin dodo exercised only 
social and moral authority over a clan (Yahaya 1980, 16). The practical implication of this 
administrative reform is that from the ward to the village level the base of ‘power’ was 
strengthened and expanded, for the first time, beyond the clan unit and the creation of a Village 
Council with a Head. This now effectively undermined any traditional arrangement that might 
have existed as the new Village Head becomes an ‘alien’ colonially inspired sole authority of some 
sort. Consequently, clans previously not under his control were, for the first time, annexed for him.  
Evidence, thus far, suggests that while at the ward/village level of ‘Southern Districts’ there 
were administrative reorganizations the Lugardian model persistent at the District level because 
“it became clear that (only) (Zaria) emirate Native Treasury offered the best available source of 
fund for development (in ‘Southern Districts’) … while central government funds were reduced to 
a minimum by the world economic recession” (Ballard 1972, 12; Robinson and Gallagher 1961). 
A number of administrative transfers occurred in Southern Zaria which raised some critical issues.    
 
The Transfers of Independent Districts and a Section of Bajju Back to Zaria Province 
In a letter dated October 3rd, 1934, Governor Donald Cameron sought the permission of the 
Secretary of State for Colonies to return the Moroa, Jaba and Kagoro Independent Districts and a 
section of the Kaje then placed in Plateau Province back to Zaria Province with effect from 
November 1st, 1934. Arguing that this transfer would have the effect of uniting two sections of one 
tribe, the Jaba (Kwoi), of which one section was in Kachia District of Zaria Province. Furthermore, 
the Kaje will also be united to a branch of the same tribe in the Zangon Katab District of Zaria 
Province. Cameron added that the Kagoro and Moroa are ethnically more related to tribes in Zaria 
Province than those in Plateau Province (Northen-(Nigeria)-Provinces-Secretariat-Book-File 
1934, 142). First, starting with the Kaje [clans] of Banewa, Bata and part of Bainbin (Kato 1974, 
94) and subsequently Jaba (Kwoi), Moroa and Kagoro Independent Districts were transferred to 
Zaria Province in 1934. These transfers raised three important administrative issues: 
(i) This transfer meant that the entire Kaje (Bajju) would now be under Zaria N.A. since they 
are now united with their kith and kin in Zangon Katab District therefore adding to the list 
of ‘Pagans’ under the control of an ‘alien’ District Head. However, the transfer of the Bajju 
in the same administrative unit provides the ground for the claim towards ‘tribal’ leadership 
of the entire Bajju by emerging ‘indigenous’ elites like Usman Sokop. Eventually, their 
discontent would develop around the demand for a separate N.A. from Zaria. This 
subsequently sparked up similar demands from other ethnic groups like the Katab (Atyab), 
Chawai, among others, in the area. Furthermore, while the collective discontents were against 
an ‘alien’ District Head, the heterogeneity of the district would also trigger dormant 
disagreements among the ethnic groups in the area. 
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(ii) With respect to the Jaba, while those from Jaba (Kwoi) Independent District, now chiefdom, 
have been transferred to Zaria Province and maintained their independent status, a section of 
them in Kachia district was not brought under the Pop Ham (Chief of Jaba). Consequently, 
a contradiction immediately emerged, for while in moment of frustration against colonial 
domination through ‘alien’ District Heads, the Jaba in Kachia district imagined their kith and 
kin in Jaba chiefdom as being free from what they perceived to be misrule and oppression 
those in the chiefdom would continue to see their brothers in Zaria N.A. as better off (Zaria 
Province File-C.35 1952; Daniel 1954).  
(iii) Both individually and collectively even though now Jaba, Moroa and Kagoro Chiefdoms 
maintained their administrative independence from Zaria N.A. but as a matter of expedience, 
stemming from their weak fiscal status, their treasuries became subordinated to Zaria N.A. 
(Tete 1974). Furthermore, since the headquarters of Zaria Province was located a few 
kilometers outside Zaria town, the Resident of the Province as well as the District Officer of 
their division resided in Zaria. This condition was interpreted as an inseparable part of Zaria 
N.A. hold on them. This laid the ground for their alliance in resentment with groups placed 
under the administration of Zaria N.A. and provided the atmosphere for the materialization 
of a Southern Zaria identity. This situation was compounded by the fact that their scribes 
were at the beginning of the 1930’s still posted from Zaria even though in the employ of the 
Provincial administration. These scribes were Hausas who were then mostly the ones 
‘literate’ enough in the language of administration in the Province, i.e., Hausa language. 
  
In a colonial context, such as this, entailing the stationing of an agent, whether ‘alien’ or 
‘indigenous’, and entrusting such agent with powers to exact taxes, adjudicate cases and maintain 
law and order, especially in the absence of a guiding traditional model, authoritarian behavior is 
inevitable (Zaria Province File-C.35 1943; Barnes 1960). This “often turns… [administration] into 
warfare, thereby infecting leaders with a siege mentality and effectively relegating development 
issues to very low priorities. [This]…disconnects [leaders] from their people and completely 
dissociates public policy from social needs; and constant coercion of the people alienates them 
from the state…seen as a force to be feared, evaded, cheated and defeated as circumstances permit” 
(Ake 1996, 2). Examples of this abound in Southern Zaria, particularly in the Independent 
Districts. The infamous case of Madaki Ibrahim in Jaba (Kwoi) who privatized, personalized and 
perverted state institutions for non-altruistic needs and dispensed ‘justice’ to the highest bidder 
while taking delight in harassing people was one (Daniel 1954). Another was the case of Chief 
Mugunta in Kagoro chiefdom whose reign ushered in political repression of unimaginable type. 
His callousness in prosecuting personal and colonial interests transformed him into an agent that 
was dreaded and systematically avoided by the people in the District. His high handedness was so 
horrendous that even the British had to remove him from office (Tete 1974). The combustible 
colonial administrative schemes in Southern Zaria got complicated with the arrival of Christian 
missionaries and the emergence of ‘tribal elites’. 
 
Christian Mission in Southern Zaria 
As British colonial officers were busy establishing ‘law and order’ and convenient 
administrative structures in the area, Christian missionary elements had already appeared in 
Southern Zaria, particularly the Independent Districts, around 1910 (Kantiok 1975; Kato 1974; 
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Samuel 1975; Turaki 1982; Lenge 1976; Tawai 1978). British administrators and favorable 
environment seemed to have encouraged the missionaries to intensify their efforts of ‘soul saving’ 
and ‘change agents’. The missionary purportedly came with the single mission of proselytizing the 
natives and considered extant traditional religion, and Islam, with disdain. Islam received more 
bashing by the missionaries as it was thought to be “utterly anti-Christian, and really blasphemous 
in its interpretation of the character of God, setting Him forth as guilty of such abominable cruelty 
as even an ordinary decent man, with all his sinfulness, would regard with horror (Mangvwat 1984, 
135). 
Consequently, with favorable British mind set, the missionaries expanded the scope of their 
activities to include the provisions of basic health and elementary education. Thus they started 
providing mission education in the Independent Districts of Moroa, Kagoro and Jaba (Kwoi). An 
important fall out of this is the emergence of and mission training of what Umar (1974) refers to 
as ‘tribal elites’ who were brought up with memories of hostile relationship with the Muslim Hausa 
and Fulani Emirates of Zaria and Jema’a. For these ‘tribal elites’ growing up within the missionary 
enterprise discouraged them from joining what they perceived to be backward, oppressive and 
non-Western Muslim Hausa and Fulani N.A. (Tete 1974). This disdain for the N.A. and refusal to 
join it, especially at levels lower than Assistant District Head or within the bureaucratic segment 
of the N.A., is clearly brought out by the categories and number of Southern Zaria people in Zaria 
N.A. in Table 3.   
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Table 3: Zaria Native Authority Appointments by Ethnic Group in Southern Zaria as at 1956 
Hausa and Fulani  ‘Indigenes ethnic groups’ 
Position Zangon 
Katab 
Kachia Kagark
o 
Zangon 
Katab 
Kachi
a 
Kagarko 
District Heads 1 1 1 - - - 
District Scribes 3 2 2 - - - 
Messengers 6 3 3 - - - 
Assistant District 
Heads 
- - - 5 3 1 
Village Heads 7 3 5 66 28 27 
Village Scribes 7 4 11 25 9 10 
Alkali/Mufti 3 2 2 - - - 
Court Scribes 1 1 1 - - - 
Court Members - - - 1 4 3 
Yan Doka (Police) 5 2 2 3 - 1 
Yari (Prison Guards) 1 1 1 - - - 
Veterinary 
Department   
3 1 1 - - - 
Agricultural 
Department  
3 1 2 - - - 
Health Department 1 - 1 - - - 
Cotton  2 2 1 - - - 
Health Education 1 1 1 - - - 
Forestry Department 6 2 2 1 3 - 
Supervisors 2 - - - - - 
Road Overseers 2 1 - - - - 
Teachers 2 1 3 9 7 - 
Source: (Zaria Province File-C.35 6/7/1952, Ibrahim 2007, 60-61)  
 
Table 3 indicates that as at 1956, although ‘tribal elites’ had long emerged as a political 
force in Southern Zaria (Lenge 1976; Tawai 1978; Turaki 1982), very few showed willingness to 
work with the N.A. They found places in the missionary enterprise and consequently became 
champions of their societies and ‘inherited’ a feeling of resentment for the Muslim Hausa and 
Fulani Emirate and associated communities, believing that their area was deliberately neglected 
by the N.A. while it privileged the Muslim Hausa and Fulani groups. A further consequence of the 
combination of the administrative structure and the activities of Christian missionaries was the 
creation of a close association between Christianity and the ethnic identities of Southern Zaria 
people in opposition to the Muslim Hausa and Fulani. This development in no small measure 
helped sow the seed of future discords that assumed religious character in the relations of the two 
groups (Willink 1958). However, inspite of that the complex administrative scheme endured in the 
face of rising discontents against it. What were those discontents and how did they define the 
struggles of the people in the area? 
In practical terms colonialism, and particularly its appearance in the form of Indirect Rule 
at the district level, translates into what the people of Southern Zaria saw as their forceful and 
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total subjugation and subordination to local ‘alien rule’ (Yohanna 1993; Ibrahim 2007). To them 
this came with total disregard and humiliation to their culture, customs, traditional institutions, 
pre-colonial political organizations and served as major drawback to their progress as a people 
and has undergirded endless crises in the area (Lekwot 2009; Duniya 2009).  A major fall out of 
this is the development of a Southern Zaria identity which socio-culturally signified groups of 
people who had been forcefully brought under the socio-cultural and religious control of Hausa 
and Fulani Muslims even though they remained ‘Pagans’ and later Christians. Administratively, 
the Southern Zaria identity referred to groups of people who were located mainly in the southern 
part of Zaria N.A. with ‘alien’ District Heads and who felt excluded from participation in the 
administration of their lives at the district level.  
As time went by this ingrained feeling provided the fulcrum around which the discontents 
of Southern Zaria people became amplified. In this context a noticeable pattern emerged as their 
struggles sequentially graduated from the initial desire for the indigenization of all District Heads 
followed by the desire for the creation of separate Districts from ‘indigenous’ District Heads 
appointed from Zaria to the agitations for the creation of independent Chiefdoms and Chiefs for 
their various ethnic groups (Ibrahim 2007). Based on the widespread desire for an indigenous 
District Head even the political association that was formed in the 1950s in the area, i.e., the 
Middle Zone League, had the cause of the indigenization of all district head appointments in 
Southern Zaria and the appointment of a Second Class Chief for the area as part of its cardinal 
principles (Yahaya 1980, 63). A catalogue of discontents necessitated reforms aimed at devolving 
some administrative responsibilities at the Village level in the mid-1950s were initiated. The 
previous Village Councils (VC) were dissolved and starting from 1956 Village Group Councils 
(VGC) (Yankuna) were established. Consequently, the previous VC composed of clans, sub-clans 
or lineages were regrouped to incorporate distinct ethnic groups of those clans, sub-clans or 
lineages in forming the VGC (Ibrahim 2007, 57). Each VGC (Yanki) had a President (Wakili) that 
was upgraded to the rank of an Assistant District Head.  In this respect ten VGCs were demarcated 
out of the four Districts in Southern Zaria. These are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Village Group Councils in the Four Southern Districts of Zaria N.A. as at 1956 
Z/Kataf District Kachia District Kagarko District  Kauru District 
Katab (Atyab) VGC Jaba VGC Koro VGC Kurama VGC 
Kaje (Bajju) VGC Kuturmi VGC   
Ikulu VGC Kadara VGC   
Kamantan VGC    
Chawai (Tsam) VGC    
  Source: (Ibrahim 2007, 60-61) 
 
Table 4 shows the four districts of Southern Zaria and their VGCs. Taking Zangon Katab 
District as a typical example, the Kataf (Atyab), Kaje (Bajju), Ikulu and Kamantan VGCs are in 
actual fact a regrouping of the defunct VCs shown in Table 2 into VGCs. The Hausa of Zango town 
were now directly under the District Head of Zangon Katab with head quarter in Zango town. The 
Chawai (Tsam) were moved into Zangon Katab district in the late 1930s. The reforms that produced 
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VGC and Assistant District Head (Wakili) were, at that time, thought to be major advance in 
responding to some of the discontents of the ‘indigenous’ people (Yahaya 1980; Usman 2002). 
However, Ibrahim (2007) contends that the qualification to the post of Wakili (President) of the 
VGC served to exclude the politically restive mission educated elites of the area as only the extant 
Village Heads (dagatai) were qualified for such appointments. This requirement for the Wakiliship 
was thought of as better built on the experience acquired by extant dagatai in administration rather 
than on inexperienced elites (Usman 2002). Thus, this group of aggrieved elites intensified their 
effort for an indigenous District Head as they saw the exclusionary measure as attempt at deflecting 
the trajectory of their agitations by Zaria N.A. through the appointment of pliable elements (Toure 
1991).  
Be that as it may by now it had already become obvious to most of the elites from Southern 
Zaria that peaceful demand was increasingly becoming a fruitless exercise and thus violent revolts 
as the most potent strategy for ‘liberation’ started gaining ground (Kaduna State Government 
1987). Inspite of this, however, at the District level the administrative scheme endured throughout 
colonial period and up to 1967 when Bala Ade Dauke Gora, was appointed as the first Christian 
indigenous District Head of Zangon Katab after John Sarki Tafida was rejected (Willink 1958; 
Irekefi 1976; Ibrahim 2007). Although a Christian, Southern Zaria elites considered John Sarki 
Tafida not representative enough because he was a Fulani with roots in the Zaria N.A. (Yahaya 
1980). Bala Ade Dauke Gora’s appointment had enduring consequences in Southern Zaria and the 
politics of Kaduna state. Some of these consequences are: 
i. The appointment bolstered the spirit of the ‘indigenous’ groups as it signified a path breaking 
triumph in the struggles against Hausa and Fulani ‘alien’ District Head and laid the ground 
for the acquisition of what Toure (2001) refers to as ‘victor’s mentality’ while on the part of 
the Hausa and Fulani ‘settler’ community Bala’s appointment indicated a threat, loss of power 
and lack of fair hearing. Presently this inclination is reproduced in the narrative of 
‘indigeneity’ in the context of the struggles for scarce but desirable resources. In this regard 
the ‘settler’ communities tend to be excluded in the definition of ‘indigeneity’ and associated 
rights and privileges by elites from Southern Zaria while groups from the ‘settler’ 
communities on their part insists on inclusion in the definition of ‘indigeneity’. For the 
Southern Zaria elites this exclusionary drive is in order to avoid what Bakut (2009) refers to 
as ‘double loss’ to the Hausa and Fulani who could get such valuables from other sections of 
Kaduna state and yet attempt to claim same from Southern Zaria at the expense of the 
‘indigenous’ people. In a significant way, this is at the heart of the present ‘indigene-settler’ 
dichotomy in Southern Zaria and places with similar mix;        
ii. Furthermore, for ethnic groups that got ‘indigenous’ District Heads appointed for them their 
demands transformed to another level as they now agitate for their District Head to be graded 
as a chief with their chiefdom liberated from Zaria N.A. The demand arose from the fact that 
the appointment of Bala Ade Dauke Gora, for example, did not indicate that the district was 
free from Zaria N.A. control. It only meant that the District Head had been replaced by 
‘indigenous’ Zaria N.A. functionary as the new District Head and the coterie of his assistants 
at the village level continued to pay homage to Zaria N.A. Presently this tendency is 
manifested in the demands for equality in the grading of the chieftaincy institution in Kaduna 
State and the rotation of the chairmanship of Kaduna State Council of Emirs and Chiefs where 
the Emir of Zazzau sits on a permanent basis. Although Southern Zaria (now Southern 
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Kaduna) is no longer under emirate rule their elites believe that the grading of majority of 
their chiefs as second and third class chiefs while the emir of Zazzau remains a first class 
chief only ends up indicating the inherent inequality of ethnic groups in Kaduna State (Nyom 
2009). The inherent inequality of ethnic groups is thought to be graphically underpinned by 
the permanent nature of the chairmanship of the Council of Emirs and Chiefs which placed 
the emir of Zazzau as the chair (Nyom 2009); 
iii. For ethnic groups like the Jaba (Ham) - the one the independent Jaba Chiefdom and the other 
under Zaria N.A. – the appointment of Bala Ade Dauke Gora would see the intensification of 
their efforts at unification under Jaba Chiefdom (Ibrahim 2007). However, most of such 
demands had been countered by petitions from elites of relatively smaller ethnic groups who 
feared the unknown consequent upon being in the proposed district (Kaduna State 
Government 1991). Under civil administrations this tendency, for example, is discernible in 
the political alliances frequently formed by elites from the ‘minority’ ethnic groups who often 
displayed a willingness to construct political networks with elites from northern part of 
Kaduna State as they were said to ‘doubt’  the ‘sincerity’ of elites from dominant indigenous 
ethnic groups (Ayuba 2009); 
iv. Ironically, within Southern Zaria the appointment of Bala Ade Dauke Gora would expose the 
fragility of the ‘unity’ among ‘indigenous’ groups in their discontents against Hausa and 
Fulani Muslim District Heads. In Zangon Katab district for example, the appointment brought 
to the fore the dormant displeasure of the non-Kataf (Atyab) against what they perceived as 
Atyab hegemony in the district. Elites from the Chawai (Tsam), Kaje (Bajju), Kamantan and 
Ikulu ethnic groups saw no sense in an arrangement that brought an end to an ‘alien’ Hausa 
and Fulani Muslim District Head only to be replaced by an ‘indigenous’ Christian Atyab 
‘alien’ District Head. Consequently, the appointment triggered the demands of other groups 
for a district of their own and a District Head from their individual ethnic groups (Duniya 
2009). Currently, this development of ‘a sense of ownership’ is manifested in the drive for an 
‘indigenous’ person to be the Chief Executive of Kaduna state as the Southern Zaria elites 
feel that only providence could make this happen. However, in this drive it appears that while 
various groups would aspire for an individual member of their ethnic group to step into that 
‘exalted’ position, dominant groups within the area might not be contented until ‘one of their 
own’ steps into that position (Ayuba 2009); and 
v. From the appointment of Bala Ade Dauke Gora in 1967, to the creation of eighteen additional 
Districts in 1991, to the creation of four more chiefdoms in 1995 and twenty one others in 
2000 in Southern Zaria, the discontent and struggles against ‘Emirate Rule’ had become a 
dominant theme in the area. This disquiet provided the platform for a number of violent 
confrontations that occurred in the area with high toll on life and property largely between 
‘indigenous’ and ‘settler’ communities which often takes on religious character and spills out 
of the area. Furthermore, although for over a decade now Southern Zaria had been ‘liberated’ 
from ‘Emirate Rule’ the psychological hang over of this discontent solidified the platform for 
the lingering agitation for the creation of ‘new’ Kaduna state especially among elites of the 
‘indigenous’ large or dominant ethnic groups.  
On the whole these historical grievances, with roots in British colonial administrative construct, 
and their enduring consequences collectively provide the ingredients that feed into and drive critical 
aspects of the national question from Kaduna State into the larger Nigerian platform. For example, 
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when viewed as sets of contradictions revolving around the emotive issue of co-existence in a 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious political space perceived to be privileging particular groups at the 
expense of others, the national question becomes unavoidably about rights that different peoples 
share or exercise therein (Momoh 2001). In the contemporary discourse of discontents in Kaduna 
State and the country at large, the case of Southern Kaduna, with roots in colonial administrative 
schemes, provides the most concrete case of the expression of the agitations of the ethnic groups 
from Stateless societies both historically and contextually. Historically it has remained unrelenting 
and each administrative adjustment had opened up new sets of agitations from Southern Kaduna. 
Contextually while the agitations had remained constant the focus had kept on changing in response 
to those administrative adjustments while perceptions within Southern Kaduna had remained static. 
Consequently, even though in post-independence Nigeria important administrative adjustments had 
taken place at both the local government and State levels which saw them becoming important 
players in the state and the country at large elites from these Stateless societies continue to interpret 
politics and political developments on an old style domination, marginalization and ‘our area is 
being deliberately neglected’ template.  
 
Conclusion 
The debate regarding colonialism in Africa had seen the recurrence of an unapologetic 
perspective which sees it as a mere episode that was positive in nature to Africa giving the 
circumstances at the initial point of contact and the subsequent burden that the white man had to 
bear in rescuing the continent. This article has shown that colonial experience in the Stateless 
societies of Africa had been accompanied by the intense transmogrification of the native and the 
native space in a manner that principally guaranteed the realization of colonial objectives. This 
came in a way that was entirely novel, unsettling and bewildering to the African and provided the 
impetuous for the stationing of native ‘alien’ administrators to service colonial demands in the 
newly created ethnic clusters. This crop of native administrators together with coterie of anything 
but indigenous staff at the district level descended upon those societies to provoke catalogue of 
discontents with far reaching implication for inter-group relations. The arrival of and the 
subsequent activities of Christian missionaries strengthened the resolve of the people to confront 
the colonial administrative designs incrementally gravitating in the direction of violent 
confrontation. In the post-colonial period the situation has essentially remained the same as 
agitations for the creation of new administrative units, especially the creation of a Southern Kaduna 
state, have festered unabated. Yet, given the dynamism which underpins the evolution of broad 
ethnic clusters and identities, the extent to which administrative re-adjustment can resolve the 
specter of these agitations is debatable. The experience of the Stateless societies of Southern Zaria 
highlights the dynamic and complex character of the broad ethnic identities engendered by 
colonialism. Indeed, the whole experience also inadvertently accentuates the challenges of 
constructing administrative units on the basis of ethnic considerations. While ethnicity continues 
to play a major role in Nigeria’s political development, it has simultaneously been at the center of 
some of the country’s major challenges.                
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